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Abstract
Volcanic risk assessment using probabilistic models is increasingly desired for risk management, particularly for loss
forecasting, critical infrastructure management, land-use planning and evacuation planning. Over the past decades
this has motivated the development of comprehensive probabilistic hazard models. However, volcanic vulnerability
models of equivalent sophistication have lagged behind hazard modelling because of the lack of evidence, data
and, until recently, minimal demand. There is an increasingly urgent need for development of quantitative volcanic
vulnerability models, including vulnerability and fragility functions, which provide robust quantitative relationships
between volcanic impact (damage and disruption) and hazard intensity. The functions available to date
predominantly quantify tephra fall impacts to buildings, driven by life safety concerns.
We present a framework for establishing quantitative relationships between volcanic impact and hazard intensity,
specifically through the derivation of vulnerability and fragility functions. We use tephra thickness and impacts to
key infrastructure sectors as examples to demonstrate our framework. Our framework incorporates impact data
sources, different impact intensity scales, preparation and fitting of data, uncertainty analysis and documentation.
The primary data sources are post-eruption impact assessments, supplemented by laboratory experiments and
expert judgment, with the latter drawing upon a wealth of semi-quantitative and qualitative studies. Different data
processing and function fitting techniques can be used to derive functions; however, due to the small datasets
currently available, simplified approaches are discussed. We stress that documentation of data processing,
assumptions and limitations is the most important aspect of function derivation; documentation provides
transparency and allows others to update functions more easily. Following our standardised approach, a volcanic
risk scientist can derive a fragility or vulnerability function, which then can be easily compared to existing functions
and updated as new data become available.
To demonstrate how to apply our framework, we derive fragility and vulnerability functions for discrete tephra fall
impacts to electricity supply, water supply, wastewater and transport networks. These functions present the
probability of an infrastructure site or network component equalling or exceeding one of four impact states as a
function of tephra thickness.
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Introduction
Volcanic eruptions are multi-hazard events which pose a
considerable threat to society, including critical infrastruc-
ture (Wilson et al. 2012a; Cottrell 2014; Wilson et al.
2014). Critical infrastructure such as electricity supply,
water supply and wastewater, transportation, communica-
tions and associated buildings, are man-made systems and
processes which function together to deliver essential ser-
vices to society (Rinaldi et al. 2001). Disruption or damage
to critical infrastructure can cause significant societal im-
pacts and economic losses. To reduce critical infrastruc-
ture losses during volcanic eruptions, successful risk
assessment and management - a combination of hazard,
exposure and vulnerability assessments - is required. Ro-
bust quantitative probabilistic volcanic risk models are in-
creasingly desirable for volcanic risk management,
particularly for loss forecasting, infrastructure manage-
ment and land-use planning. This has driven the develop-
ment of sophisticated probabilistic hazard models (e.g.,
Schilling 1998; Bonadonna 2006; Costa et al. 2006; Del
Negro et al. 2008; Wadge 2009). However, vulnerability
models have lagged considerably and there is now an in-
creasingly urgent need for quantitative vulnerability as-
sessment of volcanic hazard impacts. Quantitative
vulnerability assessments are available for buildings (e.g.,
Spence et al. 2005; Zuccaro et al. 2008; Jenkins and Spence
2009; Jenkins et al. 2014a), primarily driven by occupant
life safety concerns. For critical infrastructure there are a
number of qualitative/semi-quantitative assessments (e.g.,
Patterson 1987; Johnston and Nairn 1993; Daly and Wilkie
1999; Wilson et al. 2012a; Jenkins et al. 2014b; Wilson et
al. 2014) however, quantitative vulnerability assessments
are lacking. To address the need for comprehensive quan-
titative volcanic vulnerability assessments for all infra-
structure sectors, a framework is required to guide
volcanic risk scientists through the process of deriving
vulnerability estimates.
The aim of this paper is to present a framework for deriv-
ing quantitative relationships between hazard intensity (e.g.,
tephra thickness, flow dynamic pressure) and damage, dis-
ruption or other impact metrics to infrastructure compo-
nents or sectors from volcanic hazards. The focus is on the
derivation of fragility and vulnerability functions as these
are the most appropriate way to express infrastructure vul-
nerability and are widely used in other natural hazard fields
(e.g., Porter et al. 2007). In section Volcanic Vulnerability
Assessment Approaches we introduce vulnerability and fra-
gility functions and briefly review currently published func-
tions for volcanic vulnerability assessments. In section
Volcanic Vulnerability and Fragility Framework we present
a framework for the derivation of fragility and vulnerability
functions focusing on input data, impact and hazard inten-
sity metrics, function fitting, uncertainty analysis and docu-
mentation. The framework is designed to evolve when new
data becomes available and is recorded in different forms.
In section Volcanic Tephra Fall Fragility Functions we
demonstrate application of the framework through the der-
ivation of fragility functions for electricity, water supply,
wastewater treatment, and transportation networks im-
pacted by tephra fall. These functions are a first attempt at
quantifying vulnerability of critical infrastructure sectors for
tephra fall impacts and should be updated (e.g., calibration,
adjust function fitting, improve uncertainty assessment)
when new volcanic impact data become available. We also
suggest that the framework is transferable to other assets
such as people or agriculture. However, impacts to these as-
sets are highly spatially dependent (e.g. due to specific soci-
etal and climatic factors respectively) and application
should be approached cautiously due to limited impact data
in some locations. Finally, in Conclusions we summarise the
main contributions of our paper and discuss future research
priorities emerging from this work and the wider field.
Volcanic vulnerability assessment approaches
There are a number of qualitative and quantitative ap-
proaches that can be used to assess the vulnerability of ex-
posed elements to volcanic hazards (Table 1). Use of
qualitative descriptions of volcanic hazard impacts to differ-
ent exposed elements forms an important foundation of
volcanic impact knowledge. These qualitative descriptions
are defined based on documentation and reviews of im-
pacts from previous eruptions (e.g., Blong 1984; Spence et
al. 1996; Blong 2003a; Baxter et al. 2005; Stewart et al.
2006; Wilson et al. 2012a; Jenkins et al. 2013, 2014a; Wilson
et al. 2014). This knowledge has been successfully used for
volcanic risk management, such as informing emergency
management exercises, development of public and sector
specific information resources and some risk assessments
(Wilson et al. 2014).
While qualitative descriptions of impacts is inform-
ative, a move towards quantification of impacts is re-
quired to facilitate robust numerical estimation of risk
(Wilson et al. 2012a; Jenkins et al. 2014b; Wilson et al.
2014; Brown et al. 2015). Risk quantification allows for
comparisons between infrastructure sites/networks and
with other natural hazard risks; it provides a basis for
cost-benefit analysis of mitigation strategies. Impact state
(IS) scales and threshold levels can be used to categorise
qualitative impact data (Blong 2003b), providing a semi-
quantitative assessment of impact to infrastructure sites.
Fully quantitative vulnerability assessment requires fra-
gility and vulnerability functions. Rossetto et al. (2013)
and Tarbotton et al. (2015) define these function types as:
1. Vulnerability functions quantify a component’s mean
damage or function loss as a value relative to total
impact or as an economic cost as a function of
hazard intensity.
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2. Fragility functions quantify the probability that a
particular impact state will be equaled or exceeded
as a function of hazard intensity.
A benefit of fragility functions is that they can be plotted
as suites of data so that the likely impact across assets with
differing vulnerability is described in a visually appealing
and easy-to-interpret form. For example, multiple buildings
in an area with the same hazard intensity (e.g., 200 mm
tephra thickness) may have different impact states (e.g. un-
damaged, damaged gutters, collapsed roof) because of vari-
ations in vulnerability. A set of fragility functions for tephra
thickness describes the likely impacts across these buildings
at 200 mm (and other tephra thicknesses). Whether vulner-
ability or fragility functions are derived is dependent on the
specifications of the vulnerability assessment and available
Table 1 Description, examples, advantages and disadvantages of different types of vulnerability assessments for volcanic hazards.
Note that the advantages and disadvantages refer to the example implementation of the vulnerability assessments, not the
approaches themselves





infrastructure based upon the
presence of a volcanic hazard.
Review and documentation of
critical infrastructure impacts
from historic eruptions (Wilson et
al. 2012a; Wilson et al. 2014).
Detailed explanation of likely
impacts and vulnerabilities
for each infrastructure sector,
highlighting potential
mitigation strategies.
No indication of the differing
levels of vulnerability at a
particular site.
Difficult to compare multiple
locations.




Vulnerability indicators are an
attribute or property of a system
which influences vulnerability or
resilience to volcanic hazards.
The degree to which this
attribute influences vulnerability
can be expressed qualitatively
(e.g., high, medium, low) or with
numerical values that can be
summed to provide an overall
vulnerability value/score.
Infrastructure vulnerability
indicators to assess vulnerability
to volcanic hazards on Vulcano
Island, Italy (Galderisi et al. 2012).
Identifies which attributes
influence vulnerability and/or
resilience, providing a basis
for further research.
Provides relative spatial
distribution of areas of
different vulnerability.
Assigning qualitative
descriptions or numerical values
to indicators is subjective.
Difficult to have common
indicators and rankings for




Impact state scales categorise
infrastructure damage or
disruption into a set number of
defined states, typically ranging
from no damage to complete
destruction. Each state is typically
assigned a numerical vulnerability
value such as repair cost, damage
ratio (repair cost relative to
replacement cost) or percentage
of damage.
Damage scale for classification of
tephra induced building damage
following 1991 Mt. Pinatubo
eruption (Spence et al. 1996).
Allows simple classification of
impact into a number of
states.






Easy to process post-
eruption.
Qualitative impact descriptions
do not cover all aspects of
impact or infrastructure design.
Threshold
levels
Similar to damage states in that
impacts are categorised into a
set number of states; however, in
addition to the vulnerability
values, each impact state is also
assigned hazard intensity
threshold values (e.g., tephra
thickness, dynamic pressure).
Threshold level scales developed
to indicate hazard intensity for
each damage state for buildings
and critical infrastructure (Spence
et al. 2004; Jenkins et al. 2014b,
Wilson et al. 2014).
Provides a relationship
between impact state (i.e.,









metrics may not be appropriate
to estimate impacts for all
infrastructure components.










relative loss or economic cost to
hazard intensity.
Fragility functions express the
probability of a level of impact
being equalled or exceeded for a
given hazard intensity.
Fragility functions developed for
tephra fall impacts on buildings
and electrical transmission systems
(Spence et al. 2005; Zuccaro et al.
2008; Wardman et al. 2012b).
Impact intensity relationship
is provided as a changing
probability estimate over a
range of hazard intensities.
Mathematical approach
accounts for some of the
uncertainty associated with
these assessments.
The functions can directly
inform quantitative risk
assessments for impact and
loss estimation.
Requires large statistically valid
datasets for robust correlations.
Selected hazard intensity metric
may not be the most
appropriate to estimate impact
for all infrastructure
components.
Functions are only applicable to
the infrastructure typology they
were derived for and may not
be applicable elsewhere
without modification.
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volcanic impact data. For volcanic risk assessment, the
functions account for uncertainties (through probabilities)
in the link between hazard intensity and damage (loss)
upon which risk mitigation and management decisions are
based. Functions can also be developed which consider
mitigation actions, such as strengthening of components or
clean-up, providing useful data for risk reduction cost-
benefit analyses. Fragility functions are commonly used for
earthquake (e.g., Porter et al. 2007), tsunami (e.g., Reese et
al. 2011; Mas et al. 2012), mass movement (e.g., Quan Luna
et al. 2011; Totschnig et al. 2011) and flood (e.g., Reese and
Ramsay 2010; De Risi et al. 2013) vulnerability and risk
assessments.
Existing volcanic vulnerability and fragility functions
Volcanology has fewer existing vulnerability and fragility
functions than some other natural hazard fields (e.g., earth-
quake). Reasons for this include: (1) limited data from
which functions can be derived because the systematic col-
lection and analysis of impact data for volcanic hazards is
in its infancy (generally evolving post 1980 following the
eruption of Mount St Helens); (2) infrastructure hazard as-
sessments rarely account for volcanic hazards; (3) catastro-
phe modelling by (re)insurance organisations often does
not consider volcanic hazards; (4) there are no building or
infrastructure design codes for volcanic impacts which
would prompt the derivation of functions; and (5) volcanic
eruptions are often infrequent events on human and infra-
structure timeframes (Douglas 2007; Wilson et al. 2014). In
addition, a range of intrinsic volcanic hazard properties can
cause different impacts, leading to difficulties in deriving
functions, for instance finer grainsize tephra will generally
more rapidly block air filters compared to the same volume
per unit area of coarser tephra. Despite these challenges,
several vulnerability and fragility functions have been devel-
oped for different volcanic hazards and critical infrastruc-
ture (e.g., Blong 2003a; Douglas 2007; Jenkins and Spence
2009; Jenkins et al. 2013, 2014a, 2014b, 2015; Kaye 2007;
Maqsood et al. 2014; Pomonis et al. 1999; Schriever and
Hansen 1964; Spence et al. 1996, 2004, 2005, 2007;
Valentine 1998; Wardman et al. 2012a; Wardman et al.
2014; Wilson et al. 2012a; Wilson et al. 2012b; Zuccaro et
al. 2008; Zuccaro and De Gregorio 2013).
Key findings emerge from critical infrastructure im-
pact (Blong 1984; Wilson et al. 2012a; Wilson et al.
2014) and volcanic fragility function literature:
1. A number of vulnerability and fragility functions are
available for buildings for tephra fall (Spence et al.
2005; Kaye 2007; Jenkins and Spence 2009; Maqsood
et al. 2014), pyroclastic density currents (Spence et
al. 2007; Zuccaro et al. 2008; Jenkins and Spence
2009) and lahar (Zuccaro and De Gregorio 2013;
Jenkins et al. 2015) impacts.
2. There have been few (e.g., Kaye 2007; Wardman et
al. 2012a; Wilson et al. 2012a) attempts at
developing volcanic vulnerability and fragility
functions for critical infrastructure sectors. This is
primarily due to difficulties assessing vulnerability
across a wide range of infrastructure types, designs,
operating practices and societal pressures.
3. The majority of available volcanic vulnerability and
fragility functions are derived for specific
infrastructure and building typologies. While this
increases their accuracy for local risk assessments,
these functions are difficult to apply in other
locations. Indeed, several authors have argued for
the need to customise vulnerability and fragility
functions to the study area to ensure accuracy (i.e.
Jenkins et al. 2014a; Wilson et al. 2014).
Nevertheless there is an increasing requirement for
regional or global volcanic risk and vulnerability
assessments (e.g. the UNISDR Global Assessment of
Risk; Jenkins et al. 2014b), thus derived functions
need to account for a range of infrastructure
typologies or assume generic typologies.
4. There are limited quantitative empirical (post-
eruption impact assessments and laboratory
experiments), analytical or theoretical data to inform
the development of volcanic fragility or vulnerability
functions for critical infrastructure sectors.
5. A number of semi-quantitative impact state scales
are available (e.g., Spence et al. 2004; Jenkins et al.
2014b; Wilson et al. 2014; Jenkins et al. 2015) from
which vulnerability and fragility functions could be
derived given sufficient impact data.
6. There is a reasonable amount of qualitative
vulnerability data available, primarily from post-
eruption assessments, which can be used to inform
quantitative volcanic vulnerability assessments.
What is currently missing is a methodology to com-
bine qualitative and quantitative data to develop quanti-
tative vulnerability estimates for critical infrastructure
sectors. We address this gap here with a new volcanic
vulnerability framework, which provides a method to
use all available vulnerability data to derive vulnerability
and fragility functions.
Volcanic vulnerability and fragility framework
To assess the vulnerability of critical infrastructure to vol-
canic hazards in a robust and systematic way, a framework
is required to guide volcanic risk scientists in deriving vul-
nerability estimates. Our framework (Fig. 1) facilitates em-
pirical derivation of volcanic vulnerability and fragility
functions to quantitatively assess vulnerability of critical
infrastructure to volcanic hazards, and is based upon simi-
lar frameworks used for earthquake (e.g., Rossetto et al.
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2014a) and tsunami (e.g., Tarbotton et al. 2015) vulnerabil-
ity assessments.
Impact data
The data used to derive vulnerability and fragility func-
tions is henceforth termed impact data. Impact data re-
lates infrastructure impact to hazard intensity and can
be classified into four main groups: empirical; expert
judgment; analytical; and hybrid (Table 2).
A brief discussion of combining impact datasets (hybrid
data) is warranted as this is the most likely approach for
deriving volcanic fragility functions given the limited avail-
ability of impact data. Dataset are often combined to ob-
tain sufficient data to derive fragility functions; care is
required to do this appropriately as there will be different
biases, sources and magnitudes of uncertainty amongst
datasets (Calvi et al. 2006); this discrepancy can influence
the quality of the resulting function(s).
In the case of post-eruption impact assessment data,
there may be many different datasets available for nu-
merous eruptions and locations, all of which could be of
variable detail and quality. Rossetto et al. (2014b) sug-
gests that prior to combining datasets, impact data
should be harmonised by assuring that: (1) data type are
of the same form, e.g., if one dataset is at building-by-
building scale and another contains grouped data (e.g.,
multiple buildings in one area), the more detailed data
should be aggregated to the grouped scale; (2) building
and infrastructure typologies are consistent among data-
sets, if not, the most general typologies should be used;
and (3) impact scales are identical across datasets, if not,
a conversion to the coarsest scale (i.e., the scale with the
least levels) should occur. Ensuring consistency among
the different datasets permits more meaningful deriv-
ation of vulnerability and fragility functions. We recom-
mend using standard infrastructure impact scales such
as the recently developed Level 0–3 damage and disrup-
tion categories for tephra fall, PDCs, lava flows, and la-
hars (Wilson et al. 2014) for future post-eruption impact
assessments and function derivation. However, we note
that damage/impact states for other hazards such as
earthquakes, cyclones/hurricanes and tsunami are often
classified on alternative scales (e.g. Damage Level cat-
egories of 0–5), as are previous volcanic damage/impact
states (e.g. Blong 2003c, Baxter et al. 2005). Therefore,
additional analysis may be required to correlate previous
work with Wilson et al.’s (2014) four-tier scale.
Due to differences in impact data quality we propose a
qualitative quality rating system to indicate the quality
of data for different infrastructure components and sec-
tors (Table 3). To reduce uncertainties, high quality data
should be preferentially used to derive volcanic vulner-
ability and fragility functions.
Impact metrics (IM)
An impact metric (IM) is used to assess the volcanic im-
pact (e.g., damage) intensity for a particular infrastructure
component or sector. IMs are commonly bounded be-
tween 0 and 1 or 0–100 and are the dependent variable of
vulnerability and fragility functions. For vulnerability func-
tions, the IM can be a value or index which describes im-
pact or economic loss. Any IM can be used for a
vulnerability function depending on applicability and justi-
fication. Common IMs for vulnerability functions are:
1. Damage percentage – percentage of damage
sustained by an asset compared to pre-impact condi-
tion (e.g., a building is 90% damaged after a lahar
impact).
2. Loss of function – loss of function of an asset as a
percentage compared to pre-impact condition (e.g.,
a water treatment plant lost 20% of its function after
a tephra fall).
3. Damage index – damage percentage normalised
between 0 and 1.
Fig. 1 Empirical framework for deriving volcanic vulnerability and
fragility functions for critical infrastructure sectors
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4. Function loss index – loss of function percentage
normalised between 0 and 1.
5. Damage ratio – a ratio between the cost of repair
relative to the cost of replacement.
6. Economic cost – absolute cost of impact(s) in
monetary value.
7. Impact state (IS) – states of damage and disruption
defined by semi-quantitative impact descriptions (see
the four level impact scale of Wilson et al. (2014)).
The IM for fragility functions is the probability of an
asset equalling or exceeding a specified level of impact.
Typically, the level of impact is defined by ISs with one
function defined for each IS (i.e., a set of fragility func-
tions) or only for the highest IS. As such, the fragility
function gives the probability of equalling to or exceed-
ing the ith IS. Given that ISs are sequential, such that ISi
implies that ISi-1 has occurred, the probability of being
equal to a specific IS can be calculated by the difference
between consecutive ISs.
Hazard intensity metrics (HIM)
A hazard intensity metric (HIM) describes the intensity of a
volcanic hazard at a particular site. It is the independent
variable of vulnerability and fragility functions. Volcanic
hazards have a number of different properties which can
convey intensity, as not all HIMs adequately capture all of
the impactful attributes of volcanic hazards (Wilson et al.
2014). Therefore, the selection of an appropriate HIM is
important. As discussed in Wilson et al. (2014), the selec-
tion of a HIM must consider: (1) the HIM’s appropriateness
to describe a range of infrastructure impact intensities; (2)
the ease of HIM measurement in the field or laboratory; (3)
the applicability of the HIM to hazard model outputs; and
(4) which HIM has been used in existing impact datasets.
The most common HIMs are (Wilson et al. 2014): thick-
ness or mass loading (tephra fall, PDC deposits, lahar de-
posits), dynamic pressure (PDC, lahar), flow height (lava
flow, lahar), presence or absence (lava flow, gas emissions),
density per unit area (ballistics), impact energy (ballistics)
and concentration (gas emissions, tephra fall).
Table 2 Classification, advantages and disadvantages of volcanic impact data used to derive fragility and vulnerability functions.
Modified from Schultz et al. (2010) and Wilson et al. (2014)





Range of volcanic hazard and infrastructure
characteristics taken into account
Previous impacts are likely to occur again in the
future
Repeatable experiments in controlled
conditions
Data highly site, region, infrastructure specific
Scarce data of variable quality
Difficulties in replicating volcanic hazards in laboratory
Expert
judgement
Expert elicitation Consider a wide range of impacts, including
those not previously observed
Not limited by impact data or models
Can be used to refine and update existing
functions
Widely accepted elicitation methods available
Quality depends on subjectivity and expertise, particularly
if experience consists of atypical eruption impacts
Can be difficult to validate
Differing and contradictory opinions
Analytical Numerical
modelling
Increased reliability and repeatability and
reduced bias
Models can be validated against post-eruption
impact data
Can be extrapolated to new situations
Substantial computation may be required for more
complex modelling




Can reduce limitations and uncertainties
through the combination of different data types
Limitations are the same as individual approaches
Differences in data scale and aggregation (see text)
Table 3 Data quality ratings to evaluate the quality of volcanic
vulnerability data. We suggest that a precautionary approach
should be taken where data could fall within two categories,
assigning that data the lower quality rating option. For example,
if a scientist witnesses an eruption but does not record the
hazard intensity, then the ‘D’ quality rating should be assigned
Quality rating Data quality description
A (highest) Volcanic impacts documented following multiple (>5)
eruptions with large (>50) data points, and statistically
valid analytical modelling or experiments undertaken at
multiple recorded hazard intensities.
B Volcanic impacts observed post-eruption with recorded
hazard intensity, and experimental studies or analytical
calculations undertaken.
C Volcanic impacts witnessed by expert observers (e.g.
scientists, infrastructure operators) post-eruption, and
hazard intensity recorded.
D Volcanic impacts witnessed and/or reported post-
eruption by lay observers (e.g. public, media)), and haz-
ard intensity not recorded.
E (lowest) Volcanic impacts are possible, but not observed or
identified.
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Function derivation
Volcanic vulnerability and fragility function derivation
requires: (1) data curation to convert raw impact data
into a form which can be used for function derivation;
and (2) a method to fit functions to available data.
Data preparation
Data preparation is generally required to derive volcanic
vulnerability and fragility functions. For vulnerability
functions, each data point needs to have a hazard inten-
sity metric (HIM) value and an intensity metric (IM)
value. For fragility functions, each data point needs to
have a HIM value and an impact state (IS) level (a spe-
cific type of IM; Table 4). For the latter, data are ordered
by increasing HIM value and binned, such that each bin
has approximately the same number of data. The prob-
ability of equalling to or exceeding each IS can be calcu-
lated for each HIM bin. This is achieved by summing
the number of data points which are greater than or
equal to the IS of interest relative to the number of data
points that are assigned to lower IS’s (Fig. 2 for an ex-
ample). Discrete HIM values are obtained by taking the
median of each HIM bin. This method is commonly
used to derive fragility functions for earthquake (Porter
et al. 2007) and tsunami (Tarbotton et al. 2015) hazards.
Despite the sparsity of quantitative data for volcanic im-
pacts, the approach to bin the HIM values was adopted
to produce a framework that is consistent with those
used for other hazards. Additionally, by using this ap-
proach, initial fragility functions derived for volcanic
hazards can be easily interpreted and modified as more
data becomes available. The initial fragility function de-
velopment will also highlight where particular impact
data is lacking, identifying areas where analytical data,
and empirical data collected through targetted labora-
tory experiments, can assist.
Function fitting
Any number of discrete or continuous mathematical
functions can be fitted to impact data to obtain volcanic
vulnerability and fragility functions. While in the earth-
quake community there are guidelines for best-practice
function form (Rossetto et al. 2014b), there is no equiva-
lent in the volcano community. In volcanology, the good
faith practice is that selected functions represent the
data appropriately. In data-poor contexts, these often
take on binary or piecewise linear forms.
The simplest approach is using a binary function, such
that below some hazard intensity threshold impact does
not occur and above the threshold, impact occurs. For
example, if lava is present, an asset (e.g., a road) may be
considered completely destroyed whereas if lava is ab-
sent, the asset is undamaged.
Volcanic vulnerability and fragility functions can be
described by linear equations applied to either the whole
dataset or to individual segments; this is our preferred
method for limited datasets. The start and end point of
each line segment is defined by the available data points
after the HIM binning process. In our function deriv-
ation examples below, we took this approach because
only three HIM bins could be reasonably applied to the
limited volcanic impact data; using a complex mathem-
atical equation to interpolate between three data points
was unjustified. Eq. 1 shows the form of the piecewise
linear equation used to calculate the probability of the IS
equalling or exceeding the ith IS:
P IS≥ISið Þ¼f 0m1;i HIM þ c1;im2;iHIM þc2;im3;i HIM þc3;i HIM ¼ 0k1 < HIM≤k2k2 < HIM≤k3k3 > HIM
where m1,i, m2,i and m3,i are slope constants and c1,i, c2,i
and c3,i are intercept constants for three linear segments
for the i-th IS. Constants k1, k2 and k3, where k1 ≠ k2 ≠ k3,
are critical HIM values for which the different linear seg-
ments apply. Other mathematical equations, such as ex-
ponential and polynomial, can be used to define
vulnerability and fragility functions; however, care must
be taken with these and with linear equations, as they
are unbounded on the x-axis and y-axis and could result
in negative values or probabilities >1.
A note on normal and lognormal cumulative distribu-
tion functions (CDFs), commonly used in earthquake
and tsunami fields to define infrastructure fragility func-
tions (Rossetto et al. 2013; Tarbotton et al. 2015), is war-
ranted. Porter et al. (2007) and Rossetto et al. (2013)
note desirable properties of lognormal CDFs for fragility
function derivation are that: (1) the function is con-
strained on the y-axis between 0 and 1, which is ideal
for fitting probabilities bounded in this range; (2) the x-
axis is constrained between 0 and +∞, which prevents
negative hazard intensities; and (3) lognormal CDFs are
skewed to the left which better represents earthquake
damage data clustered around low hazard intensities. In
volcanology, lognormal CDFs have been used for fragility
functions for building damage as a result of tephra fall
and ballistics (e.g., Spence et al. 2005; Jenkins and
Spence 2009; Jenkins et al. 2014a; Blong et al. 2017)
based on how well it represents building impact data
and its use for earthquake hazards.
Mathematical equations can be fit to vulnerability and
fragility data using statistical data fitting techniques,
such as least squares or maximum likelihood estimation;
see Baker (2014), Rossetto et al. (2014b), Lallemant et al.
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Table 4 Impact states for expected impacts to critical infrastructure as a function of tephra fall thickness. Modified and updated
from Wilson et al. (2014)
Impact
State
IS0 IS1 IS2 IS3




<3 3–10 10–100 >100
Damage No damage Possible abrasion to some
moving parts, infiltration of
tephra into substation
gravel.
Damage to exposed equipment
especially those with moving parts,
possible electrical line breakage.
Structural damage to some
equipment at generation and
transmission/distribution sites,
irreparable damage to moving
parts (e.g., hydro power turbines).
Disruption No disruption Temporary disruption to service caused by insulator flashover,
cleaning and repair.
Widespread disruption to electrical






<1 1–20 20–100 >100
Damage No damage Possible clogging of filters
and some abrasion to
moving components.
Damage to pumping equipment,
other moving parts and infilling of
tanks.
Collapse of reservoir roofs and
infilling of open reservoirs and
tanks.




Contamination of water and
increased treatment required.
Possible water use restrictions.
Severe contamination of water
supply and exhaustion of supply






<3 3–10 10–50 >50
Damage No damage Possible minor abrasion to




Large amounts of sedimentation in
network some causing blockages,
some damage to treatment plant
components and possible infilling
of open tanks.
Widespread sedimentation
throughout entire network causing
some blockages, irreparable
damage to pumps and extensive
structural damage to treatment
plant components.
Disruption No disruption Reduced capacity,
operation with increased
cleaning of filters.
Temporary disruption to service to
unblock network and clean tanks
possibly resulting in discharge of
untreated sewage.
Long term to possible permanent




<1 1–30 30–150 >150
Damage No damage Possible abrasion of
runway, apron markings
and paved surfaces as a
result of clean-up
operations.
Moderate abrasion of paved
surfaces and landing lights.
Complete burial.
Disruption Airport open Airport closure, reduced visibility and traction. Possible permanent closure.
Road Threshold
(mm)
<1 1–100 100–250 >250
Damage No damage Possible increased abrasion
of road markings and
paved surfaces.
Weak bridges may experience
structural damage.
Complete burial, structural damage
to some bridges.
Disruption No disruption Reduced visibility, loss of
traction, covering of
markings and possible road
closure.
Roads impassable for some
vehicles.
Roads impassable if tephra is
unconsolidated, compacted tephra
may be driven on by some
vehicles. Likely road closures.
Rail Threshold
(mm)
<1 1–30 30–150 >150
No damage Possible abrasion and/or corrosion of railway tracks and signals,
jamming of mechanical signals and contamination of track
ballast.
Complete burial
No disruption Possible loss of grip and derailing. Impassable.
Wilson et al. Journal of Applied Volcanology  (2017) 6:14 Page 8 of 24
(2015), Tarbotton et al. (2015) and references therein for
discussion and review of statistical data fitting tech-
niques. Expert judgment can also be used to fit functions
to limited or incomplete datasets or when simplifying
complex problems, which is often required in volcan-
ology. For expert judgment to be reproducible and trans-
parent, we offer a list of guidelines for fitting functions
to volcanic impact data using statistical data fitting tech-
niques. These guidelines are not required when suffi-
cient data are available to derive vulnerability estimates
(e.g., earthquake vulnerability assessment), but are vital
in volcanology where there are limited data to base vul-
nerability estimates on.
1. Individual functions in a set are sequential, such that
ISi+1 is never reached before ISi. This allows the
progressive accumulation of impact. For example, a
building impacted by a PDC would not experience
complete destruction and then experience damage
to openings from missile impact. However,
transitions along the IS sequence may be
instantaneous and prior ISs may be omitted
completely (e.g. during a lahar, a well-sealed building
with few openings may not experience any infiltra-
tion of debris before complete damage).
2. Individual functions in a set can converge but not
intersect. Intersecting functions violate the rule of
sequential functions.
3. A probability of 0 means impacts will never occur
and conversely a probability of 1 means impacts will
certainly occur.
4. No impacts occur when the HIM value is zero. This
rule assumes normal infrastructure operation in the
absence of volcanic hazards.
5. Functions are non-decreasing, i.e., functions do not
decrease as the HIM value increases. This rule as-
sumes the impact intensity is constant or becomes
more intense as volcanic hazard intensity increases.
6. Pre-condition (e.g., maintenance, age) of
infrastructure sites can influence their vulnerability
to volcanic hazards and functions should be
modified for specific individual sites.
7. Factors such as equipment typology, level of
preparedness, mitigation strategies can influence
volcanic vulnerability and functions should be
tailored to individual infrastructure sites on a case-
by-case basis to address these site specific factors.
8. Different impact mechanisms can influence volcanic
vulnerability and the interaction or dominance of
different volcanic hazard impact mechanisms and
should be considered.
Uncertainty analysis
There are a number of uncertainties which influence the
quality of vulnerability and fragility functions (Table 5).
Aleatoric (statistical) uncertainty is introduced by the nat-
ural variation of volcanic eruptions, hazard occurrence, or
the variation of infrastructure response to volcanic hazards.
Table 4 Impact states for expected impacts to critical infrastructure as a function of tephra fall thickness. Modified and updated








<1 1–10 10–50 >50
Damage No damage No damage Abrasion of moving parts and
blockage of filters.
Extensive damage to most
components.
Disruption No disruption Reduced function until
cleaned
Reduced function and temporary
shutdowns until cleaned
Uneconomic to repair, disruption to
service until replaced.
Fig. 2 Determining IS probabilities for a HIM bin. This illustrative
example demonstrates how hypothetical field data is used to
determine the probability of IS0 - IS3 being equalled or exceeded
for HIM bin 1–10 mm
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Different sources of epistemic (systematic) uncertainty are
associated with HIMs and the volcanic impact dataset (Ros-
setto et al. 2014a). As single HIMs cannot adequately de-
scribe all the impactful aspects of a particular hazard, a
compromise is made when selecting a HIM for vulnerabil-
ity and fragility functions introducing uncertainty. This
could be overcome by deriving multiple volcanic function
sets for different HIMs or combining multiple HIMs. In
addition, most volcanic HIMs cannot be measured in real
time and rely on measurements taken after an event, eye-
witness reports, and inference from volcanic deposits or
impacts. For example, it is difficult to measure dynamic
pressures of PDCs due to their potential to cause injury
and destroy measurement equipment; therefore, the dy-
namic pressure is typically estimated from deposits or
resulting asset damage (e.g., Jenkins et al. 2013). This can
lead to large uncertainties in the measurement of volcanic
hazard intensity (e.g., Engwell et al. 2013).
Large sources of uncertainty within volcanic impact
data arise from the classification of impacts into ISs and
the often small sample size. The number of observations
in volcanic impact datasets can affect data interpretation
and statistical analysis. Currently this is a large source of
uncertainty for volcanic hazard vulnerability and fragility
functions, with many datasets containing few data (~10s
of data points). As a comparison, for earthquake fragility
functions, Rossetto et al. (2014b) consider ~30 buildings
for each building class as a minimum for function deriv-
ation, with best practice involving >100 buildings.
Regardless of the source of uncertainty or its magnitude,
identification, minimisation and quantification of all un-
certainties should be undertaken. Rossetto et al. (2014a)
considers this a fundamental step in the derivation of vul-
nerability and fragility functions for infrastructure assets.
For the volcanic fragility functions derived in the fol-
lowing section Volcanic Tephra Fall Fragility Functions,
uncertainty is accounted for at each HIM value by calcu-
lating the probability that an infrastructure site could be
in one of four ISs. Variation in the HIM value is taken
into account by binning these values and using the me-
dian bin value as discrete HIM values on each fragility
plot. Other approaches, such as the use of confidence in-
tervals (e.g., 5th and 95th percentiles), could be used to
account for uncertainties, particularly with large data
sets where these intervals can be statistically estimated.
Documentation
Documentation of volcanic vulnerability and fragility
functions is critical for their reproducibility, reliability
and implementation. Users must understand what the
functions show, how they were derived, their limitations
and applicability. Transparency and understanding can
be achieved by documenting the aspects in Table 6 for
each (or set of ) vulnerability and fragility function(s) for
volcanic hazards. Documentation also provides the basis
for review and updating of functions when further vol-
canic impact data becomes available.
Tephra fall fragility functions
Overview
In this section we present fragility functions for discrete
tephra fall impacts to the electricity supply, water sup-
ply, wastewater and transport networks using the meth-
odology outlined in the first half of this paper;
Additional file 1 provides equations for all functions
derived here. Buildings are not included here as a num-
ber of studies (e.g., Spence et al. 2005; Zuccaro et al.
2008; Jenkins and Spence 2009; Maqsood et al. 2014)
have already derived fragility functions for different
building typologies. The approach is transferable to
other assets such as people and agriculture where im-
pact data exists for certain localities (e.g. taking account
of cultural or climatic factors specific to that region
and hence the vulnerability of the asset). We focus on
tephra fall as it is the most common and widespread
volcanic hazard (Wilson et al. 2012a) and there are
more tephra fall impact data available with which to de-
rive fragility functions. We use tephra thickness as the
HIM as it is the most commonly recorded HIM. Our
fragility functions describe the probability of equalling
or exceeding one of four ISs defined by Wilson et al.
(2014) as: IS0 – no damage; IS1 – cleaning required; IS2
– repair required; and IS3 – replacement or financially
Table 5 Sources of error and uncertainty for volcanic fragility
and vulnerability functions
Factor Source of uncertainty
Hazard intensity
metric (HIM)
Lack of observed and/or measured HIM
Physical factors (e.g. compaction, erosion, natural
local variations in hazard intensity)
Incorrect measurement of HIM
Incorrect or incomplete recording of HIM (e.g.
units missing)
Selection of appropriate HIM
Impact data Localised variation in impact on assets
Asset typology (e.g. condition, age, consturction
quality) and difficulties in assigning post-event
Uncertainty in the definition of ISs
Incorrect classification of observed impacts into
ISs
Limited number of observations, spatial coverage
and biased samples
Sampling methodology
Asset data Differences in asset vulnerability for the same
asset typology
Incorrect identification of asset typology
Limited number of observations for each asset
typology
Function fitting Data manipulation
Expert judgment biases
Selection of statistical model to represent
function
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expensive repair (Table 4). Functions were fit using
segmented linear equations and modified with expert
judgment where functions violate data fitting rules (see
section Function Fitting). Additional file 2 highlights
vulnerable components and key knowledge gaps for
each sector.
Caveats
The following caveats apply to all fragility functions
here:
1. Presented fragility functions only consider generic
infrastructure design and typology due to limited
vulnerability data on specific typologies.
Vulnerability will be different when considering
different typologies and sites; therefore, functions
should be tailored on a site-by-site basis.
2. Interdependencies between infrastructure sectors are
not considered; the vulnerability of each sector is
assessed in isolation. Interdependencies between
sectors are complex, often with multiple and bi-
directional failure modes. For example, transporta-
tion may rely on continuous electricity for traffic sig-
nals, but the electricity network may rely on
transportation for generator fuel supply (Rinaldi et
al. 2001, Blake 2016). Interconnected systems create
benefits during normal operation, but can bring vul-
nerabilities and challenges when natural hazards are
encountered (Hughes and Healy 2014, Blake 2016)
and will likely influence overall vulnerability.
3. Presented fragility functions only consider discrete
tephra fall events and not prolonged, reoccurring or
remobilised tephra falls, nor clean-up and restor-
ation of infrastructure sectors following tephra fall.
4. Cumulative multi-hazard effects are not considered,
and some assets may encounter multiple impacts
with different intensities from various volcanic or
other natural hazards.
5. Mitigation actions are not considered.
Electricity supply network
Electricity supply networks comprise electricity gener-
ation sites, substation sites and transmission networks.
These three sub-sectors differ in the type of equipment
used and resulting tephra impact mechanisms and are
therefore considered separately. Commonly observed
tephra fall induced impacts are: insulator flashover;
breakage of transmission lines; abrasion of turbines and
cooling systems at generation sites; and disruption of
service at substations (Wardman et al. 2012a).
Available tephra fall vulnerability data
The majority of the vulnerability data for electrical net-
works impacted by tephra falls comes from post-
eruption impact assessments. There are data for at least
10 eruptions dating back to the 1980 Mt. St. Helens
eruption; summarised by Wardman et al. (2012a) and
Wilson et al. (2014). The majority of these data report
impacts to transmission and distribution networks, al-
though there are some data for generation and sub-
station sites. The data are primarily qualitative and
document disruption and damage as a function of tephra
fall intensity. Wardman et al. (2014) conducted system-
atic laboratory experiments to determine the probability
of insulator flashover as a function of tephra thickness







The infrastructure sector and/or sub-sector
that the functions have been derived for
and which sector they are applicable to
(e.g., are functions derived for an entire
water supply sector or the underground
pipe network).
Specific asset typology The specific asset typology (e.g., a specific
type of water pump) the functions have
been derived for or an indication if
functions are for mixed typologies (e.g., all
water pump designs).
Data source(s) Source (bibliographic reference if
available) of the volcanic impact data
used to derive functions. If expert
judgment was used, a description of how
the judgment process was conducted is
recommended.
Data quality rating Overall quality of the impact dataset used
based on the quality rating scheme in
Table 3.
Number of observations The total number of observations (data
points) used to derive fragility and
vulnerability functions.




The volcanic hazard intensity metric used
and justification for its use.
Impact state (IS) The volcanic impact state scale used or if a
new scale was developed, a description of
each impact state and justification for its use.
Function form, fitting and
manipulation
The mathematical form of the functions
used (e.g., linear, lognormal CDF, binary),
the fitting technique used (e.g., linear
regression, least-squares, expert judgment)
and any data manipulation performed.
Assumptions Discussion of any and all assumptions and
decisions made during the process of
data manipulation and function fitting.
Uncertainties Discussion and identification of the
uncertainties associated with the derived
functions and how they are accounted for.
Limitations Discussion of any and all limitations of the
derived functions. In particular, limitations
which indicate what the function should
not be used for.
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and moisture content. Experiments to document flash-
over were conducted in a controlled environment using
different insulator types common in New Zealand with
both dry and wet tephra. Other experimental research
on tephra induced insulator flashover was conducted by
Nellis and Hendrix (1980) and Matsuoka et al. (1995).
Laboratory experiments by Zorn and Walter (2016) ex-
amined changes in solar panel performance as a function
of increasing tephra thickness; however, this study is
limited in scope (i.e., only examined horizontal panels)
and is not applied here. We assess and summarise the
quality of the available vulnerability data for electrical
generation sites, substations and transmission networks
in Table 7 based on the scale presented in Table 3.
Fragility functions
Electricity generation Tephra can affect electricity gen-
eration through impacts to the cooling systems of ther-
mal power stations and through abrasion of
hydroelectric power (HEP) turbines. These impacts can
cause disruption to electricity generation.
Due to the size and scale of equipment used at electri-
city generation sites, no experiments have been under-
taken to systematically determine the vulnerability of
these to tephra fall. Thus, the fragility functions pre-
sented here are based on post-eruption impact assess-
ment data. Twelve case studies documenting impacts to
different generation types are available; Fig. 3a shows
that the majority are classified as IS1 (cleaning required)
with no documented cases of IS3 (replacement or finan-
cially expensive repair).
Impact mechanisms for the three generation types
(hydroelectric, thermal and geothermal) considered here
are fundamentally different; however, there are insuffi-
cient data to derive separate fragility functions for each
generation type. Therefore, all data are used, with expert
judgment to avoid violating data fitting rules, to derive a
set of fragility functions (Fig. 3b) for mixed-generation
types (i.e., all hydroelectric, thermal, and geothermal
generation). While no available case studies document
impacts at IS3, we assume they are likely to occur in fu-
ture eruptions and therefore IS3 has been included in
the fragility function with a probability 0.2 for the 51–
300 mm bin (based on expert judgement). See Wardman
et al. (2012a) for a full treatment of tephra fall impacts
to power stations.
Substations Substations are vulnerable to tephra fall
primarily due to flashover on insulators and energised
components, ash contamination causing reduced resist-
ivity of gravel ballast in substation yards (and thus in-
creasing step-touch potential), and blockage of
transformer cooling systems (Wardman et al. 2012a).
There are 16 post-eruption impact assessments available.
We are unaware of any experimental data for substation
components. The majority of the post-eruption impact
data are classified as IS1 (cleaning required; Fig. 4a) as a
result of operators cleaning gravel ground cover or sen-
sitive equipment such as transformers. Few instances of
substation impact ≥IS2 have been documented due to
precautionary shut-downs for cleaning (Fig. 4a). How-
ever, like generation sites, IS3 is likely to occur in future
eruptions and is therefore estimated with a probability
0.2 for the 51–300 mm bin (Fig. 4b), again based on ex-
pert judgement at this stage.
Electricity transmission lines Electricity transmission
lines are vulnerable to tephra fall resulting in temporary
or permanent disruption of electricity supply. The ma-
jority of the 24 post-eruption impact data points are
classified as requiring cleaning (IS1) to be reinstated
Table 7 Quality rating of available tephra fall impact data for
considered sectors















Gravel ground cover C
Transmission Insulators B
Conductors (lines) C
Water supply Water source General C






Wastewater Pipe network Pipes D
Pumps C
Treatment Whole site C





Aircraft (in flight) B
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(Fig. 5a). Disruption is typically caused by flashover (the
most common impact observed; Wardman et al. 2012a),
controlled shutdowns to prevent damage, and cleaning
of equipment. Physical damage such as line breakage
(IS2) has been documented in three previous eruptions
(Wardman et al. 2012a). More intense damage (IS3) has
not been documented, although could reasonably occur
in future eruptions. In addition to these post-eruption
impact data, Wardman et al. (2012a) and Wardman et
al. (2014) conducted laboratory experiments to investi-
gate what volume and characteristics of tephra led to
flashover on high voltage (HV) insulators. Insulator
flashover is classified as IS1, and therefore, we used the
Wardman et al. (2012a) flashover fragility function to in-
form and modify the IS1 function (Fig. 5b). The set of
functions in Fig. 5b are derived from all known impacts
to transmission lines and estimate the probability of
each ISs as a function of tephra thickness. We note that
the functions do not specifically account for tephra
moisture at this stage, however it should be noted that
flashover probability is increased when tephra is wet
(Wardman et al. 2012a).
Water supply networks
Water supply networks include water source areas (rivers,
lakes, and groundwater), water treatment, storage facilities
and distribution networks (above or below ground). Im-
pacts commonly caused by tephra fall are: changes in
water quality (chemical and turbidity); increased water de-
mand (typically for tephra clean-up); abrasion of pumps;
and blockage of filters at treatment plants. See Stewart et
al. (2010) and Wilson et al. (2014) for further discussion
of impacts to water supply networks.
Available tephra fall vulnerability data
The majority of the available vulnerability data for water
supply networks comes from 14 post-eruption impact as-
sessments from 1980 (Mt. St. Helens) to the present, sum-
marised in Johnston et al. (2004), Stewart et al. (2010),
Wilson et al. (2012a) and Wilson et al. (2014). These assess-
ments are of variable quality and detail; they are predomin-
antly qualitative data sets describing both disruption and
physical damage. Studies by Hindin (1981), Stewart et al.
(2006) and White et al. (2011) have quantitatively assessed
impacts to water quality (chemical contamination and
Fig. 3 Mixed electricity generation types (hydroelectric, geothermal and thermal) ash impact histogram and fragility functions. a Histogram of
available post-eruption impact data classified by IS for 1–10, 11–50, and 51–300 mm tephra thickness bins. b Derived fragility functions for mixed
electricity generation types showing probability of equalling or exceeding each IS vs tephra thickness
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turbidity) through numerical modelling and laboratory ex-
periments. We are unaware of any quantitative studies on
the physical impacts of tephra fall to water treatment plants
(WTP) and pipe distribution networks. We assess and sum-
marise the quality of the available vulnerability data for
water supply sources, pipe networks and treatment plants
in Table 7 based on the scale presented in Table 3.
Fragility functions
Tephra fall can impact water supply networks causing
both disruption and physical damage. Analysis of post-
eruption impact data shows that the most common im-
pact intensity is IS2 followed by IS1 (Fig. 6a). There is
one instance of IS3 from Pacaya where above-ground
pipes suffered damage from large tephra particles
(Wardman et al. 2012b). Because there is only one in-
stance of pipe damage, the set of fragility functions we
derive here are for individual WTPs and not pipe net-
works. Water supply pipe networks are likely to be more
resilient to tephra fall impacts as they are commonly
underground and ingestion of tephra contaminated
water is avoided; further research is required to confirm
this. However, tephra deposited into water sources may
be transported through the pipe network into the WTP,
which could result in pipe damage. Tephra arriving at
the WTP from the pipe network or from tephra contam-
inated subaerial reservoirs will likely increase system
vulnerability.
The functions in Fig. 6b reflect only direct tephra fall
impact at a water treatment plant. Fig. 6b shows that for
thin tephra falls there is a higher probability of tolerance
(IS0) and disruption type impacts (IS1). As tephra thick-
ness increases there is a higher probability of a water
treatment plant being at IS2, reflecting the higher occur-
rence of these impacts during previous eruptions. While
there are limited data to assess the probability of IS3, we
assume that as tephra thickness increases, the probabil-
ity of IS3 will also increase as a result of the increase
likelihood of tephra induced abrasion of pumps. Abra-
sion damage on pumps and other mechanical compo-
nents is more likely at tephra thicknesses ≥30 mm than
<30 mm (Wilson et al. 2014).
A limitation of this set of fragility functions is that the
time required for abrasion damage and filter blockage to
Fig. 4 Electricity substation ash impact histogram and fragility functions. a Histogram of available post-eruption impact data classified by IS for
1–10, 11–50, and 51–300 mm tephra thickness bins. b Derived fragility functions for electricity substations showing probability of equalling or
exceeding each IS vs tephra thickness
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occur is not accounted for. These impact types are con-
trolled by the tephra concentration (or ‘dose’) that com-
ponents are exposed to over time, which is currently
poorly understood and very sensitive to any mitigation
measures applied. Therefore, discretion must be used
when applying Fig. 6b functions as higher ISs (IS2, IS3)
are likely to occur sometime after a tephra fall event. In
addition, WTPs can be highly specialised and specifically
designed for the local/regional water characteristics.
Each of the 20 post-eruption instances of water supply
impact occurred at a WTP with different designs and
layouts, and the subtlety of these differences is lost in
deriving these functions (Fig. 6b). Therefore, we recom-
mend that fragility functions for WTP be derived specif-
ically for each water treatment site on a case-by-case
basis to improve vulnerability assessments.
Wastewater treatment network
Wastewater networks comprise a network of under-
ground collection pipes, pumps above-ground treatment
facilities, and discharge pipes. Wastewater networks may
be combined with stormwater systems or the two may
be completely separate, with the former configuration
increasing the overall network vulnerability as tephra
can be ingested directly into the network (Barnard
2009). Impacts commonly caused by tephra fall are:
abrasion of pumps and mechanical components; pipe
blockages; and treatment disruption (collapse of bio-
logical processes) which could result in the bypassing of
untreated wastewater. See Wilson et al. (2014) for fur-
ther discussion of impacts to wastewater networks.
Available tephra fall vulnerability data
The two primary vulnerability data sets available for
wastewater networks are post-eruption impact assess-
ments and laboratory experiments. Impact assessments
come from 8 eruptions between 1980 (Mt. St. Helens)
and 2011 (Puyehue-Cordón Caullé) and are summarised
by Barnard (2009) and Wilson et al. (2014). The only
quantitative data we are aware of are the analogue la-
boratory experiments undertaken by Barnard (2009).
Due to the size and cost of large wastewater treatment
pumps, Barnard (2009) examined pump abrasion on
smaller effluent pumps commonly used in agricultural
Fig. 5 Electricity transmission line ash impact histogram and fragility functions. a Histogram of available post-eruption impact data classified by IS
for 1–10, 11–50, and 51–300 mm tephra thickness bins. b Derived fragility functions for electricity transmission lines showing probability of
equalling or exceeding each IS vs tephra thickness
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settings. While these experiments cannot be directly
compared to wastewater pumps, they can provide insight
as to the potential impacts and guide any expert judg-
ment. We assess and summarise the quality of the avail-
able vulnerability data for wastewater pipe networks and
wastewater treatment plants (WWTP) in Table 7 based
on the scale presented in Table 3.
Fragility functions
Available post-eruption impact data shows that the most
common impact intensities are IS1 and IS2 (Fig. 7a). IS3
has been documented at tephra thicknesses between 5
and 25 mm after the 1980 Mt. St. Helens eruption. In this
case the Yakima WWTP suffered severe abrasion damage
to pumps and pumping components and the treatment
plant was bypassed which resulted in the discharge of un-
treated waste into the Yakima River (Blong 1984). While
these impacts are documented as occurring with tephra
thicknesses between 5 and 25 mm (given by isopach
maps), significantly more tephra likely passed through the
treatment plants as tephra was washed into the
stormwater network (Blong 1984). Therefore, the prob-
ability of exceeding IS3 increases as tephra thickness in-
creases (Fig. 7b). However, for thicknesses >10 mm, there
is a higher probability of a site being at IS2. This trend is
influenced by the post-eruption impact data which contain
a number of older wastewater networks which are com-
bined with stormwater networks. Tephra can enter storm-
water networks though drainage systems, introducing
additional tephra into the wastewater treatment plant,
leading to increased impact at lower recorded tephra
thicknesses. This limitation of the derived functions is dif-
ficult to overcome with available data which does not rec-
ord volume of tephra entering a treatment facility. By
obtaining additional data which combines tephra volume
and exposure time, vulnerability assessments will improve;
however, this data is difficult to obtain.
In modern wastewater systems the stormwater net-
work is typically separated, making it a closed system:
tephra is less likely to arrive at the treatment plant
through the pipe network, increasing overall resili-
ence. Tephra may still accumulate at the plant
Fig. 6 Water supply treatment plant ash impact histogram and fragility functions. a Histogram of available post-eruption impact data classified by
IS for 1–10, 11–40, and 41–150 mm tephra thickness bins. b Derived fragility functions for water supply treatment plant sites (excluding the
influence of tephra deposited in water sources or transported through pipe networks) showing probability of equalling or exceeding each IS vs
tephra thickness
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through direct air fall. As there is a limited under-
standing of how tephra enters and moves through
wastewater pipe networks, the fragility functions in
Fig. 7b are derived only for individual treatment sites
and do not consider the influence of tephra entering
through the pipe network.
Transportation networks
Transportation networks include those on land, air and
sea. Transportation networks typically include large ex-
pansive linear components (e.g., roads, railways), nodes
(e.g., airports, ports) and vehicles (e.g., cars, trains). This
section does not consider impacts to the marine sector,
vehicles, trains, aircraft or support buildings (e.g., airport
terminals and train stations). Impacts commonly caused
by tephra fall include: reduction in visibility and traction;
covering of roads and runways; and vehicle damage
(windscreen and chassis abrasion, filter blockage, seized
engines). See Wilson et al. (2014), Blake (2016) and
Blake et al. (2016; 2017a, b) for further discussion of
impacts to transportation.
Available tephra fall vulnerability data
The majority of the available transport vulnerability data
are from post-eruption impact assessments and media
reports and are typically qualitative. Large databases
have been compiled documenting impacts to airports
between 1944 and 2006 (Guffanti et al. 2008) and air-
craft between 1953 and 2009 (Guffanti et al. 2010). A
number of experiments have been undertaken to exam-
ine tephra impacts, particularly engine damage, to air-
craft inflight (e.g., Drexler et al. 2011; Dunn 2012;
Shinozaki et al. 2013; Davison and Rutke 2014; Song et
al. 2014). Impacts to rail networks are relatively poorly
documented, with the only available information from
six eruptions. Recently, quantitative data which relates
different road impact types to tephra intensity has been
developed through experimental work. Barnard (2009)
undertook a number of semi-quantitative field experi-
ments to determine the difficulty of driving on roads
covered by tephra of different thicknesses, primarily on
the slopes of Mt. Etna, Italy. Blake et al. (2017a) con-
ducted laboratory experiments to quantitatively examine
Fig. 7 Wastewater treatment plant ash impact histogram and fragility functions. a Histogram of available post-eruption impact data classified by
IS for 1–4, 5–25, and 26–50 mm tephra thickness bins. b Derived fragility functions for wastewater treatment plant sites (excluding the influence
of tephra entering and being transported through pipe networks) showing probability of equalling or exceeding each IS vs tephra thickness.
Values for tephra thickness > 50 mm are extrapolated
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the skid resistance (traction) and visibility of road mark-
ings on road surfaces covered by ash of different charac-
teristics. Blake (2016) also conducted experiments
quantifying visibility reduction during tephra falls. How-
ever, this paper does not incorporate results from these
latest laboratory tests.
We assess and summarise the quality of the available
vulnerability data for transportation networks in Table 7
based on the scale presented in Table 3.
Fragility functions
Road transportation Tephra fall can cause disruption
to the road network and can lead to traffic accidents,
congestion, reduced vehicle speed and possible road
closure. Post-eruption impact data are used to derive
road fragility functions. The reader is referred to Blake
et al. (2017b) for illustration of how to incorporate tar-
geted experimental results to refine fragility functions.
The majority of the available post-eruption impact data
can be classified as IS1 (Fig. 8a), suggesting that in most
cases loss of traction and visibility will occur. Typically
these impacts occur with thin (~1–3 mm) tephra de-
posits (Table 4) and therefore, disruption of road trans-
portation is common in distal areas. In a number of
cases roads have been closed; however, this is typically
determined by the risk tolerance and safety protocols of
managing authorities. The set of fragility functions (Fig.
8b) reflect the tendency for more sites at IS1 across all
tephra thicknesses, as it has the highest occurrence
probability. At 100 mm there is a ~ 0.2 probability that a
road remains in IS1 as post-eruption data and experi-
ments by Barnard (2009) suggest that in some cases ve-
hicles can drive through tephra deposits between 50 and
100 mm thick, albeit at a reduced speed. However, we
note that the ground clearance of some vehicles is close
to 100 mm. The only available impact assessments for
IS3 are from Barnard (2009) and Cole and Blumenthal
(2004), who suggest that all vehicles become obstructed
in >300 mm tephra accumulation, and from Wilson
(Chaitén 2008 eruption impact assessment field notes,
unpublished), who identified that a non-engineered
bridge sustained structural damage with ~200 mm of
tephra loading during the 2008 Chaitén eruption. We as-
sume the probability of exceeding IS3 in the 101–
1000 mm bin to be 0.1 based upon these assessments.
Rail transportation Railway lines can be disrupted dur-
ing tephra fall as a result of tephra covering tracks, redu-
cing grip, jamming mechanical switches and disrupting
communication signals (Blong 1984; Magill et al. 2013).
There have been six eruptions with documented impacts
to railway lines due to tephra fall. Three eruptions are
excluded from our fragility functions however; two
(Vesuvius 1906 and Sakurajima 1955-present) due to lack
of reliable tephra intensity data, and one (Chaitén 2008)
because of complications linked to thick snow accumula-
tion at the time of ashfall. A total of eight observations are
derived from the three remaining eruptions (Soufriere St
Vincent 1902, Mt. St. Helens 1980 and Shinmoedake
2011). However, we highlight that each eruption affects a
different rail type (i.e. tram, diesel or electric), and no
distinction is made for our fragility functions although it is
possible that tephra of the same intensity may result in a
different impact state depending on the rail type. Further
field or experimental data will confirm this in future.
Of the documented instances, the majority are at IS1
with an equal number at IS0 and IS2 (Fig. 9a). The set of
fragility functions derived from these data and expert
judgment show that IS1 has the highest probability of
occurring for all tephra thicknesses (Fig. 9b). This reflects
the documented tephra fall impacts which are primarily
loss of function and minor damage. Most railway tracks
are between ~90–200 mm high (Mundrey 2010), so if
tephra at least this thick accumulates, the track will be
buried and train wheels will no longer make contact with
the track, causing complete disruption. This is reflected in
the fragility function with a probability of equaling or
exceeding IS1 of 0.9 for the 11–40 mm bin, i.e., a low
probability (0.1) of sustaining no impact (Fig. 9b). Tram
tracks or tracks which are level with road surfaces
(e.g., level crossings) are likely to be buried when thinner
tephra deposits accumulate (i.e., they may become dis-
rupted with lower tephra fall intensities).
Airports The most common impact to occur at airports
during tephra fall is airport closure. Closure can result
from tephra accumulating on runways and taxiways or
the presence of tephra in the airspace surrounding an
airport (not considered here). Blake et al. (2017a) investi-
gates the skid resistance at airports, an important factor
which enables aircraft acceleration, deceleration and
change of direction on airfield surfaces. We are unaware
of any instances of physical damage to runways or taxi-
ways from direct tephra falls. However, at La Aurora
International Airport, Guatemala, the runway was se-
verely abraded after the 2010 eruption of Pacaya volcano
as a result of tephra clean-up (Wardman et al. 2012b).
Therefore, we only consider the probability that an air-
port will be closed (effectively IS1) during tephra fall.
Also the probability of closure is likely more useful to
airport operators before and during an eruption than an
estimate of potential damage.
Guffanti et al. (2008) catalogued impacts, primarily
caused by tephra fall, to airports between 1944 and 2006.
From this database, 44 instances where tephra thickness
and airport status (open or closed) was recorded (Fig. 10a)
were extracted to calculate the probability of airport
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closure as a function of tephra thickness (Fig. 10b). The
resulting binary function shows that the probability of
closure rapidly increases at low tephra fall intensities, up
to 0.8 at 4 mm, and at 20 mm all documented cases report
airport closure. The main factors influencing airport clos-
ure are aircraft damage and life safety. Aircraft can sustain
severe damage flying though tephra (Guffanti et al. 2010),
therefore airports close (in most cases at relatively thin
tephra deposits) to reduce the likelihood of damage and
aircraft crashes. However, factors such as operational re-
quirements, scheduling and economics, not accounted for
here, may determine at which point an airport closes.
Critical components
Critical components such as heating, ventilation and air
conditioning (HVAC) systems and small electronics (e.g.,
control systems, computers) are integral to most infra-
structure sectors. Vulnerability data from post-eruption
impact assessments and laboratory experiments (Gordon
et al. 2005; Barnard 2009; Wilson et al. 2012b) confirm
that these components are impacted by tephra fall.
Common impacts are: abrasion of fans and motors;
blockage of filters and ventilation holes; decreased us-
ability of computers; and temporary shutdown of sys-
tems. See Wilson et al. (2014) for further discussion of
impacts to critical components.
All documented impacts are measured against tephra
thickness. However, tephra thickness is not the most
appropriate HIM to use for these components, as the
primary damaging mechanism is ingestion of tephra
into the component, which is primarily driven by
component design. As such, fragility functions for
critical components are not derived here. Future experi-
mental studies are required which consider the tephra
concentration and the time components are exposed
to tephra, i.e., experiments should match fragility to
tephra ‘dose’.
Conclusions
This paper presents a structured framework for the der-
ivation of vulnerability and fragility functions for critical
infrastructure. These functions provide quantitative
estimates of impact intensity as a function of volcanic
hazard intensity. Such functions are required for
Fig. 8 Road transportation ash impact histogram and fragility functions. a Histogram of available post-eruption impact data classified by IS for 1–
10, 11–100, and 101–1000 mm tephra thickness bins. b Derived fragility functions for road transportation showing probability of equalling or ex-
ceeding each IS vs tephra thickness
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quantitative volcanic risk assessments. A standard
framework promotes consistent vulnerability assessment
and provides a method for the derivation of new fragility
and vulnerability functions - a much needed step in vol-
canic risk assessment.
Our framework details data source and preparation,
function requirements, data fitting approaches, uncer-
tainty considerations and documentation required to de-
rive a new vulnerability and/or function for a critical
infrastructure sector or component impacted by volcanic
hazards. The primary data source used here are post-
eruption impact assessments which document impacts
from historic eruptions. Laboratory experiments are
beneficial as they can be repeated to generate large im-
pact datasets. Laboratory data are available for some in-
frastructure sectors and components but are limited due
to the difficulties of replicating volcanic hazards and
large infrastructure components interactions in the la-
boratory. Where data are limited, expert judgment com-
plements independently obtained data in developing
fragility and vulnerability functions. We provide a set of
rules to guide expert data fitting to provide transparency
in this part of this process. Using these rules, expert de-
rived functions are based on a standard foundation and
are mathematically valid. These rules are not required in
cases where large datasets are available (e.g., earthquake
vulnerability datasets) and therefore are a unique ap-
proach for fields with scarce vulnerability data, such as
for volcanology.
Throughout the process of estimating fragilities and
vulnerabilities, the quality of the resulting functions is
affected by uncertainties related to raw data and its ma-
nipulation affects. Where possible, uncertainties should
be minimised and documented. In addition, data prepar-
ation, the function derivation process and assumptions
should be documented to ensure process transparency
and repeatability. This also enables others to assess the
quality and suitability of functions.
This paper demonstrates how our framework can be
applied with the derivation of fragility functions for
discrete tephra fall impacts to electricity supply, water
supply, wastewater and transport networks. Although
beyond the scope of this paper, if used in conjunction
with fragility functions for other volcanic hazards, the
Fig. 9 Mixed rail transportation types (tram, electric, diesel) ash impact histogram and fragility functions. a Histogram of available post-eruption
impact data classified by IS for 0.5–3, 4–10, and 11–40 mm tephra thickness bins. b Derived fragility functions for mixed rail transportation types
showing probability of equalling or exceeding each IS vs tephra thickness. Values for tephra thickness > 50 mm are extrapolated
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fragility functions for tephra fall present an opportunity
for studying the consequences of multiple hazards on
critical infrastructure networks and cascading effects.
Source data for the functions are primarily from post-
eruption impact assessments supplemented by experi-
mental data. We applied our expert judgement
guidelines as data was scarce in all cases. The resulting
functions give the probability of an infrastructure site
being equal to or exceeding one of four impact states as
a function of tephra thickness.
The derived fragility functions are a first attempt at
quantifying the vulnerability of critical infrastructure sec-
tors to tephra fall. As such, these functions are appropriate
for volcanic risk assessments provided the documented
assumptions and limitations are fully understood. We en-
visage these fragility functions will be updated with new
post-eruption impact data, experimental data and expert
judgment.
Recommendations
We recommend volcanic impact scientists adopt the
method and framework presented here as a standard ap-
proach for deriving and updating fragility and vulnerability
functions for critical infrastructure sectors impacted by
volcanic hazards. Fragility and vulnerability functions are
the next step to contribute towards robust probabilistic
volcanic risk assessments; essential for the successful man-
agement of volcanic risk.
To derive new, and update existing, fragility and vulner-
ability functions, high quality vulnerability data are re-
quired. Table 7 shows that for the majority of the critical
infrastructure considered here, data quality is average (C)
to below average (D). There are no infrastructure sectors
that have vulnerability data which can be classified as high
quality (A). This indicates that while there are data avail-
able to derive functions, additional research is required to
improve data quality and quantity. A particular focus
should be the systematic collection and central archiving
of additional post-eruption impact data as this provides
real-world vulnerability data. There also needs to be a
continued focus on laboratory experiments to improve the
understanding specific component vulnerabilities.
The fragility functions presented in this manuscript
are based on currently available data and should be
reviewed and updated when new vulnerability data be-
comes available. New vulnerability data will assist the
understanding of how each infrastructure type is con-
nected with others, which is critical for fully addressing
problems (Sword-Daniels et al. 2015). We suggest a
similar approach to Blake (2016), in that to understand
interdependent effects effectively, it may be appropriate
to initially direct vulnerability research towards fully
Fig. 10 Airport ash impact histogram and fragility functions. a Histogram of available post-eruption impact data classified by IS for 0.5–1.5, 2–5,
and 6–500 mm tephra thickness bins. b Derived fragility functions for airport closure showing probability of equalling or exceeding each IS vs
tephra thickness
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understanding the bi-directional effects between two
common interconnected systems such as transportation
and electricity (e.g. Fotouhi et al. 2017). Additionally,
new vulnerability data will improve knowledge on the
cumulative effects of multiple hazards – important for
disaster risk reduction measures. One approach to
studying impacts on infrastructure from multiple haz-
ards is through scenario development, which can also in-
vestigate cascading effects for society. Zuccaro et al.
(2008) demonstrate that once a range of scenarios are
established, stochastic models can be developed to find a
sub-set of permutations and combinations of possible ef-
fects (Zuccaro et al. 2008, Blake 2016). In the coming
years we anticipate that the quality of vulnerability data
will increase across the board resulting in high quality
functions for multiple volcanic hazards and all critical
infrastructure sectors.
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